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Political Identity and Financial Risk-Taking: Insights from Social Dominance Orientation 
 
ABSTRACT 
This paper investigates how people’s political identity is associated with their financial risk-
taking. The authors argue that conservatives’ financial risk-taking increases as their self-efficacy 
increases because of their greater social dominance orientation (SDO), whereas liberals’ 
financial risk-taking is invariant to their self-efficacy. This central hypothesis is verified in six 
studies using different measures of political identity, self-efficacy, and financial risk-taking. The 
studies also use different samples of U.S. consumers, including online panels, a large-scale data 
set spanning five election cycles, and a secondary data set of political donations made by 
managers at companies. Finally, the authors articulate and demonstrate the mediating effect of 
individuals’ focus on the upside potential of a decision among conservatives but not liberals. 
 
Keywords: political identity, self-efficacy, financial risk-taking, social dominance orientation, 
upside potential, econometrics, behavioral experiments, leverage 
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According to the Federal Reserve (2015), 94.5% of U.S. households hold financial assets 
such as cash, certificates of deposit, bonds, stocks, or mutual funds (Bricker et al. 2014). In 2014, 
U.S. consumers invested more than $1.3 trillion in financial products. Recognizing the 
importance of consumers’ financial decisions (Duclos, Wan, and Jiang 2013), marketing scholars 
have examined how various consumers’ identities—gender, moral, and social—shape their 
financial decisions, such as risk-taking (Mandel 2003), investing (He, Inman, and Mittal 2008), 
and in-store spending (Kurt, Inman, and Argo 2011). 
In this context, we examine how consumers’ political identity affects their financial 
decisions, specifically with respect to financial risk-taking. Surveys by the Pew Research Center, 
Gallup, and the American National Election Studies show that most respondents (92% or higher) 
identify themselves politically on a liberal–conservative continuum. As our studies show, 
political identity is easy to measure using consumers’ zip code, media habits, voting behavior, 
and other observable factors. Not surprisingly, firms have sought to position their financial 
offerings based on consumers’ political identity.  
A review of prior empirical research suggests that conservatives are less risk-seeking than 
liberals. As we describe in Web Appendix A, studies show that conservatives are (1) more 
sensitive to ambiguity and threats/losses (Jost et al. 2003), (2) less prone to seek novelty (Shook 
and Fazio 2009), (3) less likely to engage in sensation-seeking (Kish 1973), (4) less willing to try 
new products (Khan, Misra, and Singh 2013), and (5) less likely to look for new experiences 
(Carney et al. 2008). 
However, the link between political identity and financial risk-taking among individuals 
is less clear and beset with contradictory findings. Some studies show that conservatives are 
more risk-seeking than liberals with respect to investing in mutual funds and new business 
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ventures (Choma et al. 2014; Moore, Felton, and Wright 2010), while another study finds no 
differences between Republicans and Democrats in their choice of risky financial options 
(Morris, Carranza, and Fox 2008). These mixed findings suggest the need to understand the 
moderated nature of the association between political identity and financial risk-taking. We posit 
a person’s self-efficacy as one factor that moderates the association between political identity 
and financial risk-taking. Self-efficacy is defined as a person’s belief in his or her capability to 
perform actions that prospective situations demand (Gist 1987; Whyte, Saks, and Hook 1997). 
We locate the theoretical basis of this moderation in conservatives’ high social 
dominance orientation (SDO; Sidanius and Pratto 1999), or the extent to which people classify 
groups on a superiority–inferiority dimension and accept inequality across groups. Those with a 
high SDO are motivated to gain or maintain superiority and dominance over others. Prior 
research shows that conservatives are more likely to have a higher SDO than liberals (Duckitt 
2006; Pratto et al. 1994). Due to their relatively higher SDO, conservatives are more sensitive to 
opportunities that help them gain or maintain dominance. In contrast, liberals are less sensitive to 
these opportunities due to their relatively lower SDO. To the extent that financial gains are 
viewed as helping secure social dominance, conservatives are more likely than liberals to focus 
on gains in the financial domain. That is, conservatives’ greater focus on the upside potential and 
achievement associated with financial gains may promote greater financial risk-taking among 
this group. In summary, due to their higher SDO, conservatives’ (not liberals’) financial risk-
taking will be higher when they have higher self-efficacy. 
Six studies examine the joint effect of political identity and self-efficacy on financial 
risk-taking. These studies achieve internal and external validity and show convergent results 
across different measures of political identity, self-efficacy, and financial risk-taking as well as 
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different data sources (experiments, survey data, and secondary data). Two studies also show a 
link between political identity and SDO. By theoretically articulating and empirically 
demonstrating the effect of a consumer’s identity on decision making as a contingent 
relationship, we argue that the appropriate research question is not whether but rather when 
conservatives are different from liberals in terms of risk-seeking. Finally, we show that issue-
relevant self-efficacy (e.g., financial self-efficacy) as well as generalized self-efficacy can 
moderate financial risk-taking. Theoretically, our results help reconcile contradictory findings in 
the literature on political identity and financial risk-taking among individuals. 
 
LITERAURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
Political Identity and Financial Risk-Taking 
Political identity refers to a person’s beliefs about the primary goals and principles of a 
political system (Grove, Remy, and Zeigler 1974; Jost et al. 2003). The most dominant 
conceptualization of political identity in Western culture distinguishes conservative and liberal 
political identities (Skitka and Tetlock 1993) along two core dimensions: (1) preference for 
tradition versus social change and (2) acceptance versus rejection of inequality (Jost et al. 2003). 
As summarized in Web Appendix A, previous literature suggests that, in general, 
conservatives are less open to new experiences, less curious (Carney et al. 2008; Hirsh et al. 
2010; Lee et al. 2010), and less likely to seek novelty and new sensations (Kish 1973; Shook and 
Fazio 2009). In Jost et al.’s (2003) meta-analytic review, conservatives were higher on ambiguity 
intolerance, uncertainty avoidance, and fear of loss. A careful reading of these studies suggests a 
more nuanced relationship: conservatives and liberals seek risk differently in different domains 
(Choma et al. 2013). For example, liberals are less risk-seeking when it comes to domains such 
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as climate change (Jones 2010) or handguns, focusing instead on mechanisms that will lower 
these risks. Choma et al. (2014) examine five domains (financial, recreational, ethical, social, 
and health) and find that risk-seeking is higher among conservatives than among liberals in the 
financial domain; specifically, conservatives are more likely to choose the riskier option with a 
higher expected return than liberals. Moore, Felton, and Wright (2010) also find that 
conservatives are more risk-seeking in the financial domain. However, other studies show no 
difference in financial risk-taking between liberals and conservatives (Morris, Carranza, and Fox 
2008). 
To quantitatively examine this issue, we conducted a meta-analysis of the five empirical 
studies examining the relationship between political identity and financial risk-taking.1 As Figure 
1 shows, the effect size is statistically nonsignificant (r = .07, 95% confidence interval [CI] 
[–.001, .145]), indicating a null main effect of political identity on financial risk-taking. The I2 
value is estimated at 85.93% (95% CI [69.98%, 95.40%]), suggesting a high degree of 
heterogeneity among studies. We conclude that the association between political identity and 
financial risk-taking is best specified as a moderated relationship, as we explain in detail next. 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
Political Identity and SDO 
Social dominance orientation refers to the motivational tendency to preserve the 
dominance and high status of the in-group (Sidanius and Pratto 1999). According to Cozzolino 
and Snyder (2008), SDO is associated with conservative values, such that conservatives’ higher 
SDO is reflected in a desire to maintain the relatively higher status of their in-group through 
 
1 We selected the (partial) correlation coefficients, r, as the effect size. When correlation coefficients were 
unavailable, we calculated effect sizes using other statistical measures (e.g., Student’s t, p-value of t), applying the 
formulae given in Lipsey and Wilson (2001). 
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social hierarchy and inequality. In support of this notion, a recent survey by the Pew Research 
Center (2017) reveals that only 26% of Republicans consider economic inequality a major issue, 
compared with 66% of Democrats. In addition to accepting inequality, the survey also shows that 
conservatives (61%) more strongly believe that they can move up the economic ladder than 
liberals (36%). Thus, for conservatives, the world is a “competitive jungle” (Duckitt 2006; 
McFarland, 2005) in which a person’s primary goal should be to preserve social dominance in a 
hierarchical system (Altemeyer 1998; Duckitt 2006; Sidanius and Pratto 1999). Within 
marketing, Ordabayeva and Fernandes (2018) show that conservatives prefer vertically 
differentiated products (e.g., the best in a given category, luxury items) due to their higher SDO, 
whereas liberals prefer horizontally differentiated products (e.g., uniqueness) due to their lower 
SDO. Cozzolino and Snyder (2008) show that high-SDO individuals exhibit a stronger desire to 
achieve and are more competitive. Choma et al. (2013) show that high-SDO individuals view 
competitive hazards such as sports, war, and high-risk investments as less risky. 
Our core argument is that conservatives are likely to view financial gains as playing a key 
role in enhancing social dominance. Therefore, financial investment decisions involving an 
upside potential are more attractive to conservatives because they may increase social 
dominance. Furthermore, the upside is likely to be greater for financial decisions that involve 
higher risk than for those that involve lower risk. In contrast, liberals are more likely to focus on 
social equality; as such, a financial investment decision is less likely to evoke a strong 
motivation for gains among liberals. This difference between conservatives and liberals may 
make them differentially sensitive to self-efficacy, which is related to a focus on upside potential. 
The Moderating Role of Self-Efficacy 
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Self-efficacy is defined as a person’s perception of his or her capability to achieve a 
certain level or type of performance (Gist 1987). Prior research differentiates general self-
efficacy and domain-specific self-efficacy, showing that both affect outcomes in domains such as 
financial decisions (Romero and Craig 2017) and academic performance (Bandura 1993). In 
general, studies show that domain-specific self-efficacy (e.g., financial self-efficacy) has similar 
effects as generalized self-efficacy (Bandura 1993). For example, labeling this concept “issue 
capability,” Mittal, Ross, and Tsiros (2002) and He, Inman, and Mittal (2008) find that general 
efficacy and financial self-efficacy yield similar results. Therefore, we examine both generalized 
and financial self-efficacy as a moderator. 
People with higher self-efficacy are more optimistic, undertake more challenging tasks, 
and are more likely to explore new environments than those with lower self-efficacy (Bandura 
1997; Scholz et al. 2002). These tendencies may enhance risk-taking for a variety of reasons. 
High self-efficacy individuals believe that they are able to avoid and cope with negative 
consequences (March and Shapira 1992) and that negative events are less likely to happen to 
them (Weinstein 1980). Self-efficacy also directs a person’s attention toward positive outcomes 
(Locke et al. 1981) and positive attributes of the decision task (Karademas 2006). Self-efficacy 
also affects decisions through higher aspiration levels, higher expectations of positive outcomes 
(Bandura 1997), and higher perceived opportunities relative to threats (Krueger and Dickson 
1993, 1994). Consequently, there is a strong positive association between self-efficacy and 
financial risk-taking (e.g., Krueger and Dickson 1993, 1994; March and Shapira 1987). 
Mittal, Ross, and Tsiros (2002) show that people with higher self-efficacy have an 
increased focus on the upside potential of a decision; this upside focus leads to a higher level of 
financial risk-taking for positively framed options. Krueger and Dickson (1994) find that people 
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with higher self-efficacy focus more on opportunities than on threats and believe that these 
opportunities are more achievable. This differential focus on the upside potential leads to the 
moderating role of self-efficacy in risk-seeking behavior. 
As we theorized previously, conservatives may be more sensitive to the influence of self-
efficacy on financial risk-taking because self-efficacy increases a person’s focus on the upside 
potential or positive outcomes related to the financial decision (Mittal, Ross, and Tsiros 2002). 
Thus, due to conservatives’ higher SDO, those with a higher level of self-efficacy (relative to 
those with a lower self-efficacy) will have an increased focus on the upside potential of financial 
risk-seeking. In contrast, liberals, who generally have a lower SDO, should be invariant to 
differences in self-efficacy because they are relatively less sensitive to the upside of a financial 
decision that involves gain maximization. To be clear, we do not argue that liberals focus on the 
downside or that the effect of self-efficacy on financial risk-taking is reversed among liberals. 
Instead, we expect the interaction of political identity and self-efficacy to manifest only among 
conservatives because self-efficacy will drive financial risk-taking among conservatives but not 
among liberals. He, Inman, and Mittal (2008) make a similar argument when they show that 
men, but not women, are more focused on the upside of a financial decision due to their agentic 
orientation and exhibit distinct behaviors in response to self-efficacy. Thus, we hypothesize the 
following: 
H1: The association of consumers’ political identity with financial risk-taking will 
be moderated by self-efficacy, such that financial risk-taking among decision 
makers with a conservative political identity (those high in SDO) will 
increase as self-efficacy increases; in contrast, financial risk-taking among 
decision makers with a liberal political identity (those low in SDO) will be 
invariant to self-efficacy. 
H2: A focus on the upside potential of a decision mediates the joint effect of self-
efficacy and political identity on financial risk-taking, such that mediation 
will occur among conservatives (those high in SDO). 
9 
 
Next, we describe a series of six studies. Study 1 tests H1 using a large-scale secondary 
data set of consumers. Studies 2a–3 test H1 using several different measures of political identity 
(Study 2b), a real investment decision (Study 2b), and manipulated political identity (Study 3). 
Study 4 examines the underlying mechanism by measuring SDO and testing the mediation of a 
focus on the upside potential of a decision, as posited in H2. Finally, Study 5 replicates the results 
by examining firm-level investment decisions by managers. 
 
STUDY 1 
Data 
The first data source is the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX), with five waves of 
interviews conducted annually by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (http://www.bls.gov/cex/).2 The 
CEX provides data on consumers’ expenditures, income, and demographics. It spans 19 years 
(1996–2014) and includes 5,000–7,500 households annually. The second data source is the 
American Presidency Project at the University of California, Santa Barbara 
(http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/), which provides U.S. presidential elections data for each 
election year at the state level. 
Measures 
 Financial risk-taking. Morin and Suarez (1983) show that a household’s asset portfolio 
provides two measures of its risk-taking behavior: (1) whether a household holds risky assets and 
(2) the value of risky assets (Vissing-Jørgensen and Attanasio 2003). Measuring a household’s 
holdings of risky assets as the value of stocks, bonds, mutual funds, and other such securities, we 
created two dependent variables: (1) the value of these assets (in millions of dollars) and (2) a 
 
2 Several variables (e.g., demographics) are measured in more than two waves. For these variables, we used the most 
recent measures available because measures of financial risk-taking are only available in the last wave. 
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dummy variable taking a value of 1 if the household had positive holdings of risky assets and 0 if 
otherwise (Vissing-Jørgensen and Attanasio 2003). To be conservative, when a household had a 
missing value for risky assets but not for riskless assets (e.g., savings accounts, checking 
accounts, U.S. savings bonds), we coded the household as holding zero risky assets. 
 Political identity. The CEX database does not measure a household’s political identity. 
We measured political identity at the state level, using presidential elections data in accordance 
with Khan, Misra, and Singh’s (2013) approach. Other studies have also used geographic 
location to measure political identity (e.g., Jung et al. 2017; Ordabayeva and Fernandes 2018). 
The American Presidency Project provides the number of votes each presidential 
candidate received from each state in an election year. For each election year, we obtained the 
proportion of votes the Democratic and Republican presidential candidates received in a state. 
The difference between the two proportions measures state-level political identity. A value closer 
to 1 (–1) indicates that the household is residing in a state in which, on average, consumers are 
more politically liberal (conservative). 
Political identity, SDO, and household location (pretest). We collected data from 2,150 
participants across 50 states using Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) (male = 50.3%, Mage = 
36.33 years). Participants completed the eight-item SDO scale adapted from Pratto et al. (1994) 
(1 = “strongly disagree,” 7 = “strongly agree”; α = .73), reported their political identity (1 = 
“strongly conservative,” 7 = “strongly liberal”), and provided their five-digit zip code, which we 
used to identify their state of residence. We excluded 11 states with fewer than 10 participants. 
The remaining 39 states yielded 2,085 participants for the final analysis (for details, see Table 1). 
For each state, we computed the average SDO, individual-level political identity, and state-level 
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political identity using the average voting records from the three most recent presidential 
elections (2008, 2012, and 2016). 
[Insert Figure 2 and Table 1 about here] 
As Table 1 and Figure 2 show, political identity, as measured by state-level voting 
record, was (1) positively correlated with individuals’ self-reported political identity (r = .41) and 
(2) negatively correlated with individuals’ self-reported SDO (r = –.53). Thus, state-level voting 
behavior is a valid and reliable indicator of individuals’ political identity and SDO. 
 Self-efficacy. He, Inman, and Mittal (2008) measure self-efficacy based on the past 
winnings of participants in a game show, while Mittal, Ross and Tsiros (2002) measure it as past 
firm performance. Following these studies, we measured each household’s self-efficacy using 
the change in assets the household experienced compared with the previous year—that is, the 
sum of changes in asset values (e.g., checking and savings accounts, investment funds, saving 
bonds) the household possesses. More specifically: for household h, 
(1) Self-efficacyh = ∑ ΔAssethi
I
i=1 ,  
where ΔAssethi indicates the change in household h’s asset value of asset i in millions of dollars 
(e.g., savings account; Table B1 in Web Appendix B lists the specific assets). 
To assess that this secondary measure, we ran a pretest with 99 participants who were 
randomly assigned to (1) an increased-asset condition or (2) an unchanged-asset condition. In the 
increased-asset condition, participants’ overall asset value increased compared with the previous 
year. In the unchanged-asset condition, the asset value remained unchanged. After we controlled 
for their baseline self-efficacy, which we measured before the scenario, participants in the 
increased-asset condition reported greater self-efficacy (M = 5.34) than those in the unchanged-
asset condition (M = 4.66, F(1, 98) = 9.46, p < .01) (for measures of self-efficacy, see Web 
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Appendix C). Thus, an increase in asset value was positively associated with increased self-
efficacy. 
 Control variables. We controlled for household-specific demographics to remove the 
potential effect of systematic spending patterns. Specifically, we controlled for age, gender, race, 
area of residency, education level, income level, marital status of the head of the household, and 
a household’s level of liabilities and total expenditures (both in millions of dollars) to account for 
the household’s potential size of total assets.3 
The final sample covers five years (1996, 2000, 2004, 2008, and 2012) and 42 states, 
with 196 year-state combinations. The years and states covered in our data set correspond to 
those included in both the CEX database and the presidential election database. Table 2 shows 
the descriptive statistics and correlations for the variables. 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
Model Explanation 
The data set is cross-sectional, such that each household is only observed in a unique year 
and within a single state. Therefore, a large proportion of the variance may be attributed to 
unobserved factors across years and across states. To control for heterogeneity between 
households due to year- and state-specific factors, we used a random-effects approach and 
specified our model as follows: 
(2) Risk-taking
hjt
 
= β
0
+ β
1
Political identity
hjt
 + β
2
Self-efficacy
hjt
 + β
3
Political identity
hjt
 × Self-efficacy
hjt
 
+Γ'Controlshjt + κj + τt + εijt  
 
3 We measured liabilities as the sum of outstanding balances for mortgages, home equity loans, vehicle loans, and 
credit liabilities sources (e.g., credit cards, school loans). 
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for household h in state j at time t, where κj ~ N(0, σκ
2) and τt ~ N(0, στ
2). Controls is a vector of 
control variables (e.g., demographics), Γ is a vector of coefficients for the control variables, κ is 
the state-specific random effect, τ is the year-specific random effect, and ε is the error term.4 
We use two dependent measures: (1) value of risky assets (continuous) and (2) if a 
household holds risky assets or not (binary). For the first dependent measure, we assume that the 
error term follows a normal distribution (i.e., εijt ~ N(0, σε
2)). For the second measure, we assume 
that the error term follows a standard logistic distribution (i.e., εijt ~ Logistic(0, 1)). 
Results 
Table 3 shows that the two-way interaction between political identity and self-efficacy is 
statistically significant for both dependent measures: (1) value of risky assets (β = –1.01, p < .01) 
and (2) holds risky assets (β = –4.47, p < .05). As Figure 3 shows, households (1) have higher 
values of risky assets (β = .38, p < .01) and (2) are more likely to hold stocks (β = 1.17, p < .05) 
when they are in conservative states and have higher self-efficacy. The results for households in 
liberal states are not significant (ps > .10). These results support H1. 
[Insert Table 3 and Figure 3 about here] 
Discussion 
Study 1 supports H1 using a nationwide data set of consumers over several years. 
Although it uses a behavioral measure of political identity (i.e., actual voting behavior), the 
measure is at the state level while self-efficacy and financial risk-taking are measured at the 
household level. In Studies 2a and 2b, we test H1 using individual-level measures of political 
identity, self-efficacy, and financial risk-taking. 
 
 
4 The maximum variance inflation factor (VIF) was 2.20, indicating that multicollinearity is not a problem. 
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STUDY 2A 
Method 
Participants and design. A total of 199 participants (60% female, Mage = 36.39 years) 
were recruited from MTurk. We used a single factor (self-efficacy: high vs. low) between-
subjects design and measured political identity on different scales. After the self-efficacy 
manipulation, participants completed the financial risk-taking measure followed by items 
measuring political identity, a self-efficacy manipulation check, and demographics. 
Manipulation of self-efficacy. Participants were randomly assigned to the high (n = 101) 
and low (n = 98) financial self-efficacy conditions, and all of them completed a writing task. In 
the high (low) financial self-efficacy condition, participants listed three reasons they have high 
(low) confidence in their ability to make financial decisions. 
Financial risk-taking. Following He, Inman, and Mittal (2008), participants saw two 
investments in which they could allocate $5,000 of savings. Both options had equivalent 
expected payoffs (4%) but differed in terms of their risk. The less risky option, a bank account, 
offered a guaranteed return of 4%. The riskier option, a stock fund, offered the following 
prospects: (1) a 45% chance of generating a return of 16%, (2) a 10% chance of generating a 
return of 4%, and (3) a 45% chance of incurring a loss of 8%.5 Participants indicated the 
percentage of money they would invest in the stock fund. A higher percentage of money 
allocated to the stock fund indicates a higher level of financial risk-taking. 
Political identity. We collected five measures of political identity. First, participants 
indicated their preferred broadcasting stations to watch news (0 = Fox, 1 = MSNBC/CNN). 
 
5 We asked 40 additional participants to evaluate the riskiness of the two investments on a seven-point scale (1 = 
“not at all risky,” 7 = “very risky”). The stock fund (M = 4.98) was riskier than the bank account (M = 1.68, t = –
10.72, p < .01). Thus, our measure of financial risk-taking worked as expected. 
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Empirical studies (Stroud 2008) show conservatives’ (liberals’) preference for Fox 
(CNN/MSNBC). Second, participants indicated the party with which they most closely identify 
(0 = Republican, 1 = Democrat). Third, participants self-reported their political identity on a 
seven-point scale (1 = “strongly conservative,” 7 = “strongly liberal”; Winterich, Zhang, and 
Mittal 2012). Fourth, participants completed Mehrabian’s (1996) seven-item scale of political 
identity (1 = “strongly disagree,” 7 = “strongly agree”; α = .89). Fifth, participants indicated their 
likelihoods of voting for the Democratic (Hillary Clinton) or the Republican (Donald Trump) 
candidate in the 2016 presidential election (0 = “definitely would not,” 100 = “definitely 
would”). We subtracted the likelihood of voting for Donald Trump from that of voting for 
Hillary Clinton to measure participants’ political identity. On all scales, higher scores indicate a 
more liberal political identity. 
Self-efficacy (manipulation check). We adapted Schwarzer and Jerusalem’s (1995) self-
efficacy scale (α = .93) for a financial context (for items, see Web Appendix C). 
Results 
 Manipulation check for self-efficacy. A full-factorial analysis of variance (ANOVA) on 
the self-efficacy score revealed that the manipulation was successful. Participants in the high 
self-efficacy condition rated their financial self-efficacy higher than those in the low self-efficacy 
condition (Mhigh = 5.05 vs. Mlow = 4.20, F(1, 198) = 28.88, p < .01). 
 Main results (H1). We ran five analyses, one with each measure of political identity, 
manipulated self-efficacy, and participants’ investment decisions. The results appear in Table 4. 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
When we measured political identity with binary variables (i.e., preferred broadcasting 
station, political party identification), we conducted a 2 (political identity) × 2 (self-efficacy) 
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ANOVA. For continuous measures of political identity (i.e., conservative–liberal self-placement, 
the Mehrabian seven-item scale, and likelihood of voting for the Democratic or the Republican 
candidate), we ran a regression analysis. 
The correlations among the variables appear in Web Appendix D. As Table 4 shows, four 
of the five measures support the hypothesized interaction in H1.
6 More importantly, when we 
estimate the combined interactive effect using the meta-analytic technique that McShane and 
Böckenholt (2017) recommend, the results are statistically significant (95% CI [–.19, –.07]; see 
Figure 4). Thus, the results support H1. 
[Insert Figure 4 about here] 
Discussion 
In support of H1, conservatives allocated a higher proportion of their assets to the riskier 
stock fund, relative to the safer bank account, as their self-efficacy increased. In contrast, 
liberals’ financial risk-taking was invariant to their level of self-efficacy. 
 
STUDY 2B 
Study 2b enhances the generalizability of Study 2a by using a real, incentive-compatible 
task. Participants chose between two existing financial products provided by the Vanguard 
Group (rather than fictitious products) in a context in which they received their chosen option 
through a lottery. 
Method 
Participants and design. Participants (N = 300, 39% female, Mage = 33.81 years) were 
recruited through MTurk. In addition to their regular compensation, each participant also took 
 
6 Detailed results appear in Web Appendix E. 
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part in an incentive-compatible lottery, which served as the dependent variable. Participants were 
told that each of them would be automatically enrolled in a lottery, and one randomly selected 
person would win $100 in the form of the financial product (i.e., the Vanguard fund) they chose. 
Then, they chose between the two funds described next and completed measures of self-efficacy, 
political identity, and demographics. 
Financial risk-taking. The two funds were the Vanguard Short-Term Inflation-Protected 
Securities Fund and the Vanguard Emerging Markets Select Stock Fund (for details, see Web 
Appendix C; see also https://investor.vanguard.com/). 
Financial risk-taking (pretest). A new set of 40 participants rated the perceived riskiness 
of the two funds on a seven-point Likert scale (1 = “not at all risky,” 7 = “very risky”). As we 
expected, participants perceived the Vanguard Emerging Markets Select Stock Fund (M = 6.05) 
as riskier than the Vanguard Short-Term Inflation-Protected Securities Fund (M = 2.20, t = –
16.00, p < .01). We coded choice of the Vanguard Emerging Markets Select Stock Fund as 1 and 
the other as 0. 
Political identity. We measured political identity using a participant’s preferred news 
station (0 = Fox [conservative], 1 = MSNBC/CNN [liberal]). 
Self-efficacy. We used Schwarzer and Jerusalem’s (1995) self-efficacy scale (α = .94). 
Results 
We used a logistic regression model for fund choice (1 = risky, 0 = not risky). The two-
way interaction between self-efficacy and political identity was statistically significant (β = –.62, 
p < .05). In line with Aiken and West (1991), the interaction in Figure 5 shows that financial 
risk-taking increases with self-efficacy for conservatives (β = .48, p < .10) but is invariant to self-
efficacy among liberals (β = –.14, p > .10). Thus, the results fully support H1. 
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[Insert Figure 5 about here] 
Discussion 
Study 2b enhances the generalizability of Study 1b by using an incentive-compatible 
choice task with real funds offered by the Vanguard Group. 
 
STUDY 3  
This study manipulates both political identity and self-efficacy, enabling us to rule out 
alternative factors such as gender, age, and education level, which may be associated with a 
person’s measured political identity and/or self-efficacy. As such, Study 3 establishes the causal 
effect of political identity and self-efficacy on financial risk-taking (H1). 
Method 
 Participants and design. This study uses a 2 (political identity: conservative vs. liberal) × 
2 (self-efficacy: high vs. low) between-subjects design with 392 participants from MTurk (52% 
female, Mage = 36.88 years). Because MTurk participants have been shown to be relatively more 
liberal (Huff and Tingley 2015), we used a quota-sampling method to recruit respondents, with 
political identity measured through news-media preference (Fox News vs. CNN/MSNBC) as the 
quota control. We used news media preference instead of more direct measures to avoid 
explicitly revealing the intent of the study. We assessed news media preference along with other 
demographics (e.g., gender, age) before the main survey. Then, within each stratum—Fox News 
and MSNBC/CNN—we randomly assigned participants to the liberal and conservative 
manipulation conditions. Thus, half of each of the Fox News and MSNBC/CNN viewers 
received the liberal manipulation, and the other half received the conservative manipulation. We 
found no differences in age and gender across conditions. After completing the political-identity 
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manipulation, participants randomly received either the high self-efficacy or the low self-efficacy 
manipulation along with the financial decision task. 
Manipulation of political identity. To manipulate political identity, we followed 
Ordabayeva and Fernandes (2018). In the conservative (liberal) condition, participants recalled 
and wrote about a situation in which they were interacting with someone who was more liberal 
(conservative) than them such that they felt they had a conservative (liberal) position. Although 
manipulating political identity different from a person’s original identity is very difficult, it is 
possible to influence perceptions of one’s relative ideological position using this approach. 
Manipulation of self-efficacy. Participants saw the investment options used in Study 2a, 
but with the investment amount increased to $20,000. In the high self-efficacy condition, 
participants were asked to imagine that they have successfully managed and increased their 
assets to $20,000 over the past few years. In the low self-efficacy condition, they were asked to 
imagine that they have not been very successful, retaining only the $20,000 principal amount. A 
pretest with 215 adults on MTurk (female 46%, Mage = 36.10 years) verified that participants in 
the high self-efficacy condition perceived their financial capability (1 = “very low,” 7 = “very 
high”) as higher than those in the low self-efficacy condition (Mhigh = 5.14 vs. Mlow = 4.67, F(1, 
213) = 6.22, p < .05). 
Financial risk-taking. Participants indicated if they would invest the money in the stock 
fund or the bank account on an 11-point scale (1 = “definitely will not invest in the stock fund,” 
11 = “definitely will invest in the stock fund”; a higher value indicates higher financial risk-
taking). 
Political identity (manipulation check). As a manipulation check, participants reported 
their political identity on a single-item measure (1 = “very conservative,” 7 = “very liberal”). 
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Results 
 Manipulation check (political identity). Participants in the conservative condition 
reported that they were more conservative than those in the liberal condition (Mconservative = 4.01 
vs. Mliberal = 4.55, F(1, 390) = 8.36, p < .01), indicating a successful manipulation. 
Effect of political identity on financial risk-taking. A two-way ANOVA on financial risk-
taking with political identity and self-efficacy revealed a significant interaction (F(1, 388) = 4.39, 
p < .05). Results are shown in Figure 6. Among conservatives, the preference for the riskier 
investment option was marginally higher when self-efficacy was high (M = 5.49) than when it 
was low (M = 4.61, F(1, 388) = 3.62, p = .058). Among liberals, there was no difference between 
the high (M = 4.31) and the low (M = 4.80) self-efficacy conditions (F(1, 388), p > .10). 
[Insert Figure 6 about here] 
Discussion 
By manipulating political identity and self-efficacy, Study 3 provides causal evidence for 
our focal hypothesis. The findings rule out alternative explanations based on factors such as 
customer demographics that may be associated with political identity (and self-efficacy). In the 
next study, we also measure SDO to examine its role more directly. 
 
STUDY 4 
Study 4 seeks (1) to directly test the role of SDO and (2) to demonstrate the underlying 
mediating process through a focus on the upside potential (H2). To accomplish this, we measure 
both political identity and SDO along with self-efficacy. 
Method 
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Participants and design. MTurk participants (N = 450, 52% female, Mage = 37.91 years) 
completed the same tasks as Study 2a. After the investment task scenario, participants completed 
measures of their focus on the upside potential (i.e., the proposed mediator), SDO, political 
identity, self-efficacy, and demographics. 
Financial risk-taking. As in Studies 2a and 3, participants rated their preference for 
investing in the stock fund (vs. the bank account) using an 11-point scale (1 = “definitely will not 
invest in the stock fund,” 11 = “definitely will invest in the stock fund”). 
Focus on upside versus downside potential. Participants rated the importance of six items 
in their financial decision task (1 = “not at all important,” 7 = “extremely important”). Three 
items included (1) increasing possible gains, (2) maximizing potential gains, and (3) achieving 
potential gains. We averaged these items to compute a measure of participants’ focus on the 
upside potential (α = .95). The final three items included (4) decreasing possible losses, (5) 
minimizing potential losses, and (6) avoiding the downside. We averaged these to compute 
participants’ focus on the downside potential (α = .96). 
SDO. We measured SDO using a 16-item scale (1 = “strongly disagree,” 7 = “strongly 
agree”; see Ho et al. 2015), where higher scores indicate higher SDO (see Web Appendix C; α 
= .95). 
Political identity. We used two measures to asses political identity: (1) news media 
preference (0 = Fox News, 1 = CNN/MSNBC), as in Studies 2a and 2b, and (2) self-reported 
political identity (1 = “strongly conservative,” 7 = “strongly liberal”). The results we report are 
for media preference, but they are also replicate using self-reported political identity (see Web 
Appendix F). 
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Self-efficacy. We used two items to asses self-efficacy: (1) “I generally have the ability to 
handle whatever comes my way in life,” and (2) “I feel confident in my ability to cope with 
important changes in my life” (r = .88). 
Results 
Main analysis. We ran two separate models: one with political identity as a predictor and 
one with SDO as a predictor. We report the results in Model 1 of Table 5, Panels A and B. They 
are also shown in Figure 7. In the first model, the two-way interaction between political identity 
and self-efficacy was statistically significant (β = –.68, p < .05). A simple-slopes test shows that 
financial risk-taking increased with self-efficacy among conservatives (β = .79, p < .01) but not 
among liberals (β = .12, p > .10). The second model used SDO instead of political identity. The 
interaction of SDO and self-efficacy was significant (β = .19, p < .05). A simple-slopes test 
shows that the financial risk-taking of high-SDO participants (+1 SD) increased with self-
efficacy (β = .62, p < .01), while the financial risk-taking of low-SDO participants (–1 SD) was 
invariant to self-efficacy (β = .11, p > .10).  
[Insert Figure 7 about here] 
The mediating role of a focus on the upside potential (H2). H2 posits that the interactive 
effect of political identity and self-efficacy on financial risk-taking is mediated by a focus on the 
upside potential among conservatives but not among liberals. We conducted a moderated 
mediation analysis using the PROCESS macro (Hayes 2013, Model 8). The results from 5,000 
bootstrapped samples indicate that the interaction had a significant indirect effect on financial 
risk-taking through participants’ focus on the upside potential (ab = –.37, 95% CI [–.64, –.10]). 
We examined the indirect effects separately. Among conservatives, mediation through a focus on 
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the upside potential was statistically significant (ab = .47, 95% CI [.25, .70]), but mediation was 
not significant among liberals (ab = .10, 95% CI [–.05, .25]). Figure 8 summarizes these results. 
[Insert Figure 8 about here] 
Next, we replicated this analysis with SDO as the predictor. The interactive effect 
between SDO and self-efficacy on financial risk-taking was mediated by a focus on the upside 
potential (ab = .12, 95% CI [.05, .21]). Furthermore, mediation through a focus on the upside 
potential was significant among high-SDO participants (ab = .41, 95% CI [.25, .56]) but not 
among low-SDO participants (ab = .07, 95% CI [–.09, .24]). 
Both moderated-mediation analyses provide consistent results. Self-efficacy increased 
financial risk-taking among conservatives and high-SDO individuals through a focus on the 
upside potential. Among liberals and low-SDO individuals, there was no mediation through a 
focus on the upside potential.7 
[Insert Tables 5a and 5b about here] 
Focus on the downside potential. Consistent with our theory, a focus on the downside 
potential did not mediate the joint effect of (1) political identity and self-efficacy (abpolitical identity 
= –.02, 95% CI [–.10, .06]) or (2) SDO and self-efficacy (abSDO = .04, 95% CI [–.06, .12]) on 
financial risk-taking. 
Discussion 
In addition to confirming H1 using SDO and political identity, Study 4 also tests the 
underlying mediation through an increased focus on the upside potential of a financial decision. 
 
 
7 A conventional mediation analysis using the three-step approach also confirms these results. The results appear in 
Tables 5a and 5b. The mediation analysis using self-reported political identity (conservative–liberal) exhibits the 
same pattern of results (see Web Appendix F). We visualize these findings in Web Appendix F. 
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STUDY 5  
Prior research shows that conservative managers take fewer risks than liberal managers 
(Christensen et al. 2015; Hutton, Jiang, and Kumar 2014; Kashmiri and Mahajan 2017). Yet 
these studies do not test the moderating role of self-efficacy. The goal of Study 5, therefore, is to 
ascertain if the moderating role of self-efficacy can be replicated at the managerial level. 
Data 
Our firm-level data set had three sources. First, for each firm, the Center for Responsive 
Politics (http://www.opensecrets.org/) provided political contributions data. These data are based 
on Federal Election Commission (FEC) records; since 1979 individuals have been required to 
report contributions of more than $200 to election campaigns. Second, we used Compustat to 
obtain firm-level information. Third, we obtained information on each firm’s executives from the 
Compustat ExecuComp database. We matched the contributors’ first name, last name, and 
employer (i.e., firm name) in the FEC data set to those in the ExecuComp data set to measure 
political donations by firms’ executives. 
Measure of Variables 
 Financial risk-taking. At the firm level, we used three measures of risk-taking: 
• Research and development (R&D), a key marketing-relevant activity (Hauser, Tellis, 
and Griffin 2006), can measure a firm’s financial risk-taking. We measured a firm’s 
R&D intensity as the ratio of R&D expenditures to sales. 
• We computed variability in return on assets (ROA), a widely used measure of 
financial risk-taking (Miller and Bromiley 1990), as the variance in ROA for the 
previous five years. 
• Financial leverage reflects managers’ tendency to take risks (Singh 1986). We 
measured financial leverage as the ratio of long-term debt and debt in current 
liabilities to total assets. 
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 Political identity. Following Christensen et al. (2015), we measured the political 
identities of a firm’s management as the difference between executives’ contributions to the 
Democratic Party and contributions to the Republican Party and then dividing this value by the 
total contributions to both parties.8 This measure ranged between –1 and 1, such that a value 
closer to 1 (–1) indicates that the firm’s management is characterized as more politically liberal 
(conservative). 
 Self-efficacy. Prior research has measured managers’ self-efficacy as the level of past 
performance relative to a reference point (Cervone and Peake 1986; Hayward and Hambrick 
1997). He, Inman, and Mittal (2008) measure self-efficacy of competitors in a game show based 
on the number of their past correct answers. 
We use the firm’s financial performance relative to its peers (i.e., competitors operating 
in the same industry based on four-digit Standard Industrial Classification codes) to measure the 
level of self-efficacy of a firm’s management.9 Following prior research (Miller and Chen 2004), 
we used ROA to measure firm performance in the current period (ROAt) and industry-median 
performance in the previous period (industry median ROAt-1) to measure the firm’s reference 
point. Their difference (ROAt – industry median ROAt-1) reflects firm-level self-efficacy. 
 Control variables. Firm-specific and industry-specific controls include the firm’s ROA, 
liquidity, financial leverage, operating leverage, and size, as well as industry concentration (for 
details, see Table B2 in Web Appendix B).10 
Method 
 
8 We used the weighted average of executives’ contributions, where the inverse of the rank of each executive served 
as the weight (for details, see Christensen et al. 2015). 
9 We thank the reviewers for this suggestion. 
10 We excluded financial leverage from the set of control variables when the variable served as the dependent 
measure. 
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Due to the time-series cross-sectional data set, we ran a series of diagnostic tests for each 
dependent variable. First, the Breusch-Pagan test rejected the null hypothesis of homoskedastic 
errors for all dependent measures (ps < .01). Second, the Wooldridge test confirmed the presence 
of serial correlation for all dependent measures (ps < .01). Third, to test whether there were any 
unobserved effects at the firm and industry levels, we conducted a likelihood ratio test 
comparing a model with firm and industry random effects and a model with no random effects. 
For all dependent variables, the test rejected the null hypothesis of no unobserved effects (ps 
< .01). Accounting for these issues, we specified our model as follows. For firm i in industry j at 
time t, 
(3) 
Risk-taking
ijt
 
= β
0
 + β
1
Political identity
ijt-1
 + β
2
Self-efficacy
ijt-1
 + β
3
Political identity
ijt-1
 × Self-efficacy
ijt-1
 
+ Γ'Controlsijt-1 + ∑ δtYeart
T
t=1  + νi + υj + εijt,  
where νi ~ N(0, σν
2), υj ~ N(0, συ
2), εijt = ρεijt-1  + μijt(μ ~ N(0, σε
2) and |ρ|<1). Controls is a vector 
of control variables, Γ is a vector of coefficients for the control variables, ν is the firm-specific 
random effect, υ is the industry-specific random effect, and ε is the error term. 
We lagged all independent variables by one period relative to the dependent variable. 
Among all models, the maximum variance inflation factor (VIF) was 5.673, and the highest 
condition number was 10.506, indicating that multicollinearity is not an issue. 
Results 
The results are based on a final sample of 13,655–23,847 firm-year observations, 
depending on the dependent measure, for 22 years (i.e., 1994–2015). Table 6 shows the 
descriptive statistics and correlation matrix of the variables. 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
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Table 7 shows that the two-way interaction between political identity and self-efficacy is 
statistically significant for all three measures: R&D intensity (β = –.51, p < .01), ROA variability 
(β = –.02, p < .01), and financial leverage (β = –.01, p < .01). We plot these results in Figure 9. 
R&D intensity. R&D intensity increased when management had higher self-efficacy for 
firms run by conservative managers (β = 1.92, p < .01) but not for firms run by liberal managers 
(β = 1.19, p > .05). 
ROA variability. ROA variability increased when management had higher self-efficacy 
for firms run by conservative managers (β = .04, p < .01) but not for firms run by liberal 
managers (β = .02, p > .05). 
Financial leverage. Financial leverage increased when management had higher self-
efficacy for firms run by conservative managers (β = .03, p < .05) but not for firms run by liberal 
managers (β = .01, p > .10). 
[Insert Table 7 and Figure 9 about here] 
Discussion 
In a managerial context, the results of Study 5 fully support H1 for the three dependent 
measures of firm financial risk-taking (i.e., R&D intensity, ROA variability, and financial 
leverage). These results provide additional insights into managerially oriented studies that only 
show a main effect of political identity, whereby conservative managers are less risk-taking than 
liberal managers. Similar to the results at the individual level, the moderating role of self-
efficacy at the firm level suggests that a contingent approach should be used to examine the role 
of political identity in firm-level risk-taking and other financial decisions. 
 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
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Building on the notion that conservatives are generally higher in SDO, we theoretically 
articulate the moderating role of self-efficacy in financial risk-taking and the mediating role of 
conservatives’ focus on the upside potential. Six studies consistently show that the association 
between political identity and financial risk-taking grows stronger with higher self-efficacy for 
conservatives but is invariant among liberals. Furthermore, conservatives’ focus on the upside 
potential of a decision mediates this interaction. 
Table 8 summarizes the studies. We measure political identity as people’s self-reported 
political identity (Studies 2a and 4), preferred cable news station (Studies 2a, 2b, and 4), 
contributions to political parties (Study 5), voting behavior (Studies 1 and 2a), and party 
affiliation (Study 2a), as well as through a multi-item scale (Study 2a). Study 3 manipulates 
political identity. We measure SDO in Study 4 and replicate the results for political identity 
using SDO. We measure self-efficacy using a general self-efficacy scale (Studies 2b and 4) and a 
behavioral measure specific to relative financial performance (i.e., Studies 1 and 5); we also 
manipulate self-efficacy using a feedback task (Study 2a) and past performance (Study 3). We 
assess financial risk-taking in different ways: investments in different financial products (Studies 
2a, 3, and 4) and choice among existing financial products (Study 2b); households’ holdings of 
risky assets (Study 1); and firms’ R&D intensity, ROA variability, and financial leverage (Study 
5). We use individual-level data (Studies 2a–4), household-level data (Study 1), and firm-level 
data (Study 5) to test our hypotheses. Reassuringly, as Table 8 shows, all these studies show 
convergent results. 
[Insert Table 8 about here] 
The data also reveal some noteworthy patterns that should be examined in future 
research. Specifically, high self-efficacy conservatives showed higher financial risk-taking than 
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liberals and low self-efficacy conservatives in Studies 2b, 3, and 4; at the same time, Studies 1 
and 5 show that high self-efficacy conservatives were equal to liberals in their risk-taking. A 
possible explanation may be that Studies 1 and 5 measure self-efficacy based on past 
performance, while the other studies use self-reported scales. More generally, these results 
suggest a more nuanced approach to understanding self-efficacy in the context of financial 
decision making. These results also suggest that conclusions based on direct comparisons 
between liberals and conservatives should be tempered in light of potential moderators. 
Theoretical Contributions 
To the rich and emerging body of research examining the implications of consumers’ 
political identity (Fernandes and Mandel 2014; Khan, Misra, and Singh 2013; Kidwell, Farmer, 
and Hardesty 2013; Ordabayeva and Fernandes 2018; Winterich, Zhang, and Mittal 2012), our 
primary contributions are in situating SDO as a theoretical lens for explaining the effect of 
political identity, specifying self-efficacy as a moderator of the observed effect, identifying the 
upside potential of a decision as a mediator of the observed effect, and resolving previously 
inconsistent findings in the literature on political identity and financial risk-taking. 
By examining the effect of political identity as a contingent effect, our research sheds 
light on contradictory results found in previous studies. Most firm-level studies (Christensen et 
al. 2015; Hutton, Jiang, and Kumar 2014) that find lower financial risk-seeking among 
conservative managers only examine main effects. However, after we consider the moderating 
role of self-efficacy, Study 5 uses firm-level data to replicate the results from studies using 
individual-level data. In terms of the main effect of political identity, the three financial risk-
taking measures in Study 5 exhibit different patterns of main effects. For ROA variability, firms 
operated by conservative (vs. liberal) managers are more risk-taking, whereas for R&D intensity 
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and financial leverage, firms operated by conservatives and liberals exhibited similar levels of 
risk-taking. However, the theoretically interesting and managerially relevant finding—consistent 
across all three measures—is the moderating role of self-efficacy: With an increase in self-
efficacy, financial risk-taking increases at a faster rate among conservative managers than among 
liberal managers. If the moderating role of self-efficacy were ignored, the association between 
political identity and risk-taking would have been interpreted as mixed. Though we obtain 
consistent results among individuals and firms, more research examining differences in risk-
taking among individual- and managerial-level decision makers is needed. 
The SDO construct deserves further research. We believe that SDO can explain 
conservatives’ focus on the upside potential of a decision, especially when they hold a relatively 
high sense of self-efficacy. While we do not fully understand liberals’ motivation in the financial 
risk-taking process, this gap provides an important area for future research. Specifically, the 
asymmetric finding—that is, conservatives’ high SDO increases financial risk-taking through 
their focus on the upside potential, while liberals’ low SDO is irrelevant with respect to their 
focus on the downside potential—needs to be further unpacked. More generally, there is a need 
to theoretically and empirically understand the role of SDO in relation to other identities in 
general (e.g., gender, social status) and other hierarchy-enhancing legitimizing identities in 
particular (e.g., power distance). From a research perspective, it will be useful to understand the 
common and unique aspects of SDO relative to other constructs such as agentic/communal 
orientation (He, Inman, and Mittal 2008), which may provide underlying explanations for 
observed differences based on political, gender and other identities. 
Recently, Jost, Langer and Singh (2017) suggest psychological correlates of political 
identity that may be correlated with consumer complaining, boycotting, and disputing. They 
31 
 
argue that liberals are more likely to engage in such behaviors because they are more tolerant of 
uncertainty, insecurity, and social discord. Yet, the specific role played by a person’s SDO in 
such behaviors remains unexamined. It could be that conservatives with higher self efficacy are 
also more likely to complain because of a higher belief of having complaints resolved in their 
favor. Thus, a more nuanced approach could be possible based on SDO and political identity. 
Another potential research avenue is to explore whether and how SDO operates in other 
domains such as health risk and social risk and with respect to other consumer behaviors such as 
donations, food consumption, and branding. Even within the narrow domain of financial risk-
taking, we concur with Choma et al.’s (2013) suggestion that financial risk-taking is likely a 
function of several underlying motives related to particular types of goals embedded in a 
person’s SDO. While we have shown that a focus on the upside potential of decisions is one such 
mechanism, there are likely additional mechanisms that can be uncovered and examined in 
further research. 
Practical Implications 
At the most basic level, marketing managers can segment customers based on their 
political identity and SDO through observable factors such as media consumption and 
geographic location. As Table 1 shows, consumers’ state of residence provides a reliable 
measure of SDO and political identity; however, SDO may be more useful than political identity 
for understanding consumers’ motivations and behaviors, as SDO is likely to be related to a 
variety of other identities as well. Managers can also measure consumers’ self-efficacy directly 
using a simple scale or indirectly based on their past portfolio performance. Based on the results 
of such an assessment, consumer training, products, and services can be designed to help 
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consumers optimize their financial goals. However, we do not provide any guidance about an 
optimal risk-taking level, which is likely to vary based on each person’s unique situation. 
Our measures of political identity—party affiliation, preferred cable news station, state of 
residence—may be used to better identify customers with a specific political identity and SDO 
and then tailor products and services accordingly. Companies can use our simple manipulation 
task (Study 3) to prime political identity and influence consumers’ risk-taking tendencies. 
Limitations 
First, we had to use state-level voting behaviors as a proxy of individuals’ political 
orientation (Study 1). Although this aggregate-level measure has been used in previous research 
and although we validated it through a pretest, it is not without its limitations. In a similar vein, 
Study 5 measured all the constructs at the firm level. As such, methodologies to simultaneously 
measure political identity and SDO at the individual and firm levels are needed. 
Second, there is a need to test different measures of political identity to improve the 
validity of their predictive and statistical conclusions. Although we have shown a consistent 
pattern of results by adopting various and actionable indicators of political identity, our results 
with different measures are not uniformly strong. Some observed effects in Study 2a were only 
marginal or directional. For example, the measure of political identity based on media preference 
for Fox News versus CNN/MSNBC (in Study 2a, 2b, and 4) may be improved by including 
additional broadcasting outlets. Despite being highly correlated, each measure of political 
identity may have advantages and disadvantages in specific situations. Thus, a comparative study 
measuring their relative costs and benefits will be useful. Research is also needed to explore the 
dimensionality of political identity. Thus, there may be separate dimensions—for example, fiscal 
and social—to political identity that require further exploration.  
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Figure 1 
A SYSTEMATIC REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE ON INDIVIDUAL POLITICAL IDENTITY AND FINANCIAL RISK-TAKING 
 
* Variables are reverse coded such that higher values of political orientation indicate higher levels of political conservatism and higher values of the dependent 
variable indicate higher levels of risk-taking. 
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Figure 2 
SDO BY STATES 
 
Figure 3 
THE INTERACTIVE EFFECT OF POLITICAL IDENTITY AND SELF-EFFICACY ON 
HOUSEHOLDS’ FINANCIAL RISK-TAKING (STUDY 1) 
A: Value of Risky Assets 
 
B: Holds Risky Assets 
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Figure 4 
COMBINED INTERACTIVE EFFECTS OF POLITICAL IDENTITY AND SELF-EFFICACY 
(STUDY 2A) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5 
THE INTERACTIVE EFFECT OF MEASURED 
POLITICAL IDENTITY AND SELF-EFFICACY 
ON CHOICE OF RISKIER STOCK FUND (STUDY 
2B) 
Figure 6 
THE INTERACTIVE EFFECT OF MANIPULATED 
POLITICAL IDENTITY AND SELF-EFFICACY 
ON FINANCIAL RISK-TAKING (STUDY 3) 
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Figure 7 
THE INTERACTIVE EFFECT OF POLITICAL IDENTITY/SDO AND SELF-EFFICACY ON FINANCIAL 
RISK-TAKING (STUDY 4) 
A: Political Identity × Self-Efficacy 
 
B: SDO × Self-Efficacy 
 
 
  
Figure 8 
MEDIATION ANALYSIS: FOX NEWS VERSUS CNN/MSNBC × SELF-EFFICACY (STUDY 4) 
 
 
 
 
 
*p < .10. 
**p < .05. 
***p < .01. 
Notes: ab = –.367, 95% CI [–.641, –.104]. 
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 Figure 9 
THE INTERACTIVE EFFECT OF POLITICAL IDENTITY AND SELF-EFFICACY ON FINANCIAL RISK-
TAKING BY FIRM MANAGERS (STUDY 5) 
A: R&D Intensity 
 
B: ROA Variability 
 
  
C: Financial Leverage 
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Table 1 
STATE-LEVEL DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND CORRELATION MATRIX  
(STUDY 1 PRETEST) 
  M SD 1 2 
1. Voting record (Democratic % – Republican %) .005 .185   
2. Self-reported political identity 4.426 .446 .405  
3 SDO 4.123 4.700 –.534 –.612 
Notes: n = 39 states. Correlations significant at p < .05 are in bold. The number of respondents for each 
state is as follows: California (284), Florida (148), Texas (146), New York (139), Pennsylvania (113), 
North Carolina (85), Illinois (78), Ohio (76), Michigan (73), Georgia (62), Virginia (60), New Jersey 
(56), Arizona (51), Washington (51), Missouri (50), Oregon (50), Tennessee (48), Indiana (43), 
Massachusetts (40), Colorado (36), Wisconsin (36), Maryland (35), Alabama (31), Minnesota (31), 
Kentucky(30), Connecticut (26), Louisiana (26), South Carolina (23), Oklahoma (20), New Mexico 
(19), Nevada (18), Kansas (17), Arkansas (14), Mississippi (14), Utah (13), Delaware (11), Hawaii (11), 
Maine (11), and Idaho (10). 
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Table 2 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND CORRELATION MATRIX (STUDY 1) 
  N M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
1. Value of risky assets 3,127 .13 .41                  
2. Holds risky assets 14,945 .21 .41 .01                 
3. Political identity 14,945 .04 .16 .04 .02                
4. Self-efficacy 14,945 .00 .06 .07 .03 –.02               
5. Age 14,945 46.20 14.87 .18 .07 .06 –.03              
6. Female 14,945 .46 .50 –.01 –.10 –.02 –.02 .00             
7. Whitea 14,945 .83 .38 .04 .11 –.04 .00 .01 –.08            
8. Other racea 14,945 .06 .24 –.03 –.03 .10 .00 –.03 –.02 –.56           
9. Northeastb 14,945 .19 .39 .02 .01 .42 .00 .04 .00 .05 –.04          
10. Midwestb 14,945 .22 .42 –.05 .04 .04 .00 –.01 .00 .05 –.06 –.25         
11. Southb 14,945 .32 .46 .01 –.06 –.39 .01 .00 .03 –.08 –.08 –.32 –.36        
12. Low incomec 14,945 .29 .45 –.05 –.15 –.06 –.03 .06 .13 –.08 –.02 –.01 –.01 .03       
13. Middle incomec 14,945 .30 .46 –.05 –.10 –.02 –.04 .00 .02 –.01 .00 –.02 .00 .02 –.42      
14. Low educationd 14,945 .36 .48 –.07 –.18 .00 –.02 .12 .00 –.03 –.03 .02 .00 .04 .15 .08     
15. Mid educationd 14,945 .21 .41 –.02 –.04 –.05 –.01 –.07 .04 .00 –.02 –.05 .00 –.01 .02 .03 –.38    
16. Marriede 14,945 .60 .49 .05 .10 .00 .03 .04 –.25 .08 .03 .01 –.01 .00 –.22 –.11 .00 –.05   
17. Liabilities 14,945 .10 .15 .09 .10 .07 .05 –.06 –.05 .01 .08 .00 –.05 –.06 –.14 –.15 –.18 –.05 .20  
18. Total expenditures 14,945 .01 .02 .16 .13 .05 .04 .03 –.04 .03 .03 .04 –.01 –.05 –.15 –.11 –.13 –.04 .18 .30 
a The base case for race is African American. 
b The base case for residential area is the western region.  
c Low income = 0–33.33th percentile; middle income = 33.34–66.67th percentile. The base case for income is high income (66.68–100th percentile). 
d Low education = high school graduate or lower; middle education = attended some college. The base case for education is high education (college or advanced 
degree). 
e The base case for marital status is “other than married” (i.e., divorced, never married, separated, or widowed). 
Notes: Correlations significant at p < .05 are in bold. 
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Table 3 
THE IMPACT OF POLITICAL IDENTITY AND SELF-EFFICACY ON 
HOUSEHOLDS’ FINANCIAL RISK-TAKING (STUDY 1) 
 Value of Risky Assets  Holds Risky Assets 
 Coef. SE  Coef. SE 
Political identity (PI) .09 * .06   .15  .27 
Self-efficacy (SE) .22 *** .06  .30  .33 
PI × SE –1.01 *** .34  –4.47 ** 2.10 
        
Liabilities .07  .05  .72 *** .15 
Total expenditures 1.78 *** .30  7.34 *** 1.11 
Age .01 *** .00  .02 *** .00 
Female .00  .02  –.26 *** .05 
White .06 * .03  .85 *** .10 
Other race –.03  .05  .28 ** .14 
Northeast –.03  .02  –.01  .14 
Midwest –.04 * .02  .11  .12 
South .00  .02  –.27 ** .11 
Low income –.05 ** .02  –.98 *** .06 
Middle income –.04 ** .02  –.68 *** .06 
Low education –.07 *** .02  –1.15 *** .06 
Middle education –.02  .02  –.55 *** .06 
Married .01  .02  .00  .05 
Intercept .15 *** .05  –1.21 *** .23 
        
σκ
2 .00  .00  .04 *** .02 
στ
2 .01 *** .00  .18 *** .12 
σε
2 .15 *** .00     
        
–2LL 2,982.19    13,311.30   
AIC 3,024.19    13,351.30   
BIC 3,151.19    13,503.54   
        
n 3,127      14,945   
*p < .10. 
**p < .05. 
***p < .01. 
Notes: All continuous variables are centered at the mean. AIC = Akaike information criterion, 
BIC = Bayesian information criterion. 
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Table 4 
THE INTERACTIVE EFFECT OF POLITICAL IDENTITY AND SELF-EFFICACY ON FINANCIAL RISK-TAKING (STUDY 2A) 
 
Measurea Fox News Versus 
MSNBC/CNNb 
 Republican/Democratb  Liberal–Conservative  Mehrabian  Clinton Versus Trump 
 F(1, 198)   F(1, 198)   Coef. SE  Coef. SE  Coef. SE 
Political identity (PI) .35       .07       1.21   1.76   3.59   3.03   .06   .04 
Self-efficacy (SE) .20    .25    .19  3.79  .40  3.78  .31  3.75 
PI × SE 1.27    4.65 **   -3.96 * 2.31  -6.82 * 3.93  -.14 ** .06 
Intercept         34.80 *** 2.70  34.93 *** 2.69  34.76 *** 2.67 
                    
nc 199    199    199    199    199   
Model F .56    1.61    1.29    1.03    2.35 *  
R2 .01       .02       .02       .02       .04     
*p < .10. 
**p < .05. 
***p < .01. 
a Measures for political identity are as follows: 
• Fox News vs MSNBC/CNN: From which broadcasting stations do you prefer to watch news on television? 
• Republican/Democrat: Please indicate the political party with which you most identify. 
• Liberal–Conservative: On the scale below, please indicate the response which best represents your political identity (1 = “strongly conservative,” 4 = “neutral 
[moderate],” 7 = “strongly liberal”). 
• Mehrabian: seven-item scale. 
• Clinton and Trump: If you were to vote today for the 2016 presidential election, how likely would you be to vote for the following candidates? (0 = “definitely 
would not,” 100 = “definitely would”). Political identity = Clinton – Trump. 
b We used an ANOVA and report F-statistics for the effects when we measured political identity as a binary variable. 
c Among all 200 participants, 1 participant who responded 1000% for the investment task was excluded. Therefore, the final sample size is 199. 
Notes: All continuous variables are centered at the mean. 
47 
 
Table 5 
MEDIATION ANALYSIS 
 
A: Mediation Through Focus on Upside Potential on the Interaction Between Political Identity and Self-Efficacy (Study 4) 
 
Model 1. 
DV: Investment Likelihood 
 
Model 2. 
DV: Focus on Upside Potential 
 
Model 3. 
DV: Investment Likelihood 
 Coef. SE  Coef. SE  Coef. SE 
Political identity (PI)a 2.73 * 1.50   1.71 ** .76   1.07   1.32 
Self-efficacy (SE) 1.47 *** .48  .86 *** .24  .63  .42 
PI × SE –.68 ** .27  –.38 *** .14  –.31  .24 
Focus on upside potential         .97 *** .08 
Intercept –1.22  2.67  .88  1.35  –2.08  2.32 
            
n 450    450    450   
Model F 7.55 ***   8.57 ***   43.10 ***  
R2 .05       .05       .28     
 
B: Mediation Through Focus on Upside Potential on the Interaction Between SDO and Self-Efficacy (Study 4) 
 
Model 1. 
DV: Investment Likelihood 
 
Model 2. 
DV: Focus on Upside Potential 
 
Model 3. 
DV: Investment Likelihood 
 Coef. SE  Coef. SE  Coef. SE 
SDO .46 *** .12   .14 ** .06   .32 **** .10 
Self-efficacy (SE) .36 *** .12  .25 *** .06  .12  .11 
SDO × SE .19 ** .09  .13 *** .04  .07  .08 
Focus on upside potential         .96 *** .08 
Intercept 5.17 *** .16  4.97 *** .08  .40  .43 
            
n 450    450    450   
Model F 10.75 ***   2.78 ***   8.20 ***  
R2 .07       .06       .29     
*p < .10. 
**p < .05. 
***p < .01. 
a We measured political identity using a single item (0 = Fox News, 1 = CNN/MSNBC). 
Notes: All continuous variables are centered at the mean. DV = dependent variable. 
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Table 6 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND CORRELATION MATRIX (STUDY 5) 
  n M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1. R&D intensityt 13,655
3 
.21 5.29                     
2. ROA variabilityt 21,935 .01 .14 .04          
3. Financial leveraget 23,847 .24 .20 –.02 .01         
4. Political identityt-1 23,899 –.34 .69 .04 .03 –.04        
5. Self-efficacyt-1 23,899 .02 .15 –.05 –.24 –.15 –.01       
6. ROAt-1 23,899 .04 .15 –.11 –.29 –.15 –.03 .89      
7. Liquidityt-1 23,899 2.23 1.98 .04 .04 –.26 .06 .07 .01     
8. Financial leveraget-1 23,859 .23 .19 –.03 .02 .90 –.05 –.15 –.16 –.28    
9. Operating leveraget-1 23,899 .32 .24 –.04 –.06 .29 –.14 –.06 –.02 –.29 .29   
10
. 
Firm sizet-1 23,899 7.45 1.61 –.06 –.08 .25 .01 .04 .07 –.35 .26 .19  
11
. 
Industry concentrationt-1 23,899 .26 .20 –.02 .00 –.01 –.04 –.02 .01 .00 –.01 –.19 .03 
Notes: Correlation significant at p < .05 are in bold. 
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Table 7 
THE IMPACT OF POLITICAL IDENTITY AND SELF-EFFICACY ON FIRM FINANCIAL RISK-
TAKING (STUDY 5) 
 R&D Intensity  ROA Variability  Financial Leverage 
 Coef. SE  Coef. SE  Coef. SE 
Political identity (PI) .11   .12   –.01 ** .00   .00   .00 
Self-efficacy (SE) 1.56 ** .65  .03 *** .01  .02 * .01 
PI × SE –.51 ** .22  –.02 *** .01  –.01 *** .01 
            
ROA –1.88 *** .69  –.16 *** .01  –.04 *** .01 
Liquidity .07 *** .03  .00 *** .00  .00  .00 
Financial leverage –.49  .35  .01  .01     
Operational leverage –.60  .58  –.02 *** .01  .09 *** .01 
Firm size –.12  .08  –.01 *** .00  .02 *** .00 
Competitive intensity –.32  .50  .00  .01  .00  .01 
Intercept .80 *** .27  .01 * .01  .27 *** .01 
            
σν
2 .05  .21  .00 *** .00  .01 *** .00 
συ
2 .24  1.50  .00 *** .00  .01 *** .00 
σε
2 43.86 *** 2.09  .02 *** .00  .03 *** .00 
            
AR 1 (ρ) .86 *** .01  .85 *** .00  .87 *** .01 
            
–2LL 73,895.85    –47,419.39    –46,775.38   
AIC 73,965.85    –47,349.39    –46,707.38   
BIC 74,229.12    –47,069.54    –46,432.68   
            
n 13,655    21,935    23,847   
Number of firms 1,370    2,114    2,257   
Number of industries 274       344       347     
*p < .10. 
**p < .05. 
***p < .01. 
Notes: All continuous variables are centered at the mean. 
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Table 8: SUMMARY OF EFFECTS (STUDIES 1–5) 
     Political Identity 
     Conservative Liberal 
Study 
Sample 
Size Political Identity  Self-Efficacy DV  Low SE High SE Low SE High SE 
1 3,127 State-level voting 
record 
Changes in 
household assets  
Value of risky 
assetsa in a 
household 
.088 .182 .155 .172 
1 14,945   Whether a 
household holds 
risky assetsa  
21.6% 23.7% 23.9% 23.0% 
2A 199 Fox News vs. 
CNN/MSNBC 
Manipulated 
financial self-
efficacy 
Proportion to invest 
in a stock fund (vs. 
a bank account)  
33.5% 39.8% 35.7% 32.9% 
2A 199 Democratic vs. 
Republican 
  30.2% 40.5% 37.5% 31.1% 
2A 199 Self-reported  
liberal-conservative 
  32.8% 39.6% 36.8% 30.4% 
2A 199 Mehrabian’s seven-
item scale 
  31.4% 38.5% 35.3% 32.2% 
2A 199 Preferred candidate 
in the 2016 election 
  30.9% 40.8% 38.7% 29.3% 
2B 300 Fox News vs. 
CNN/MSNBC 
Schwarzer and 
Jerusalem’s (1995) 
general self-efficacy  
Choice of a risky 
fund  
35.7% 59.1% 52.2% 45.4% 
3 392 Manipulated Manipulated Preference for a 
stock fund (vs. bank 
account) 
4.61 5.49 4.80 4.31 
4 450 Self-reported 
liberal-conservative 
Two-item general 
self-efficacy 
Preference for a 
stock fund (vs. bank 
account) 
4.86 6.30  4.55 4.86 
4 450 Fox News vs. 
CNN/MSNBC 
  4.71 6.70 4.71 5.00 
4 450 SDO   5.01 6.57 4.42 4.69 
5 13,655 Manager’s donation 
to the Democratic 
vs. Republican 
Party 
Past performance of 
firms compared with 
competitors 
R&D intensity .400 1.082 .675 1.055 
5 21,935   ROA variability .005 .017 .002 .008 
5 23,847   Financial leverage .264 .274 .269 .273 
Gb 206 Self-reported 
liberal-conservative 
Schwarzer and 
Jerusalem (1995)’s 
general self-efficacy 
Proportion to invest 
in a stock fund (vs. 
bank account) 
31.3% 51.1% 34.5% 31.0% 
Hb 296 Preferred candidate 
in the 2016 election 
Schwarzer and 
Jerusalem’s (1995) 
general self-efficacy 
Proportion to invest 
in a stock fund (vs. 
bank account) 
47.0% 68.0% 52.1% 54.3% 
a Stocks, bonds, mutual funds, and other securities. 
b These studies are described in Web Appendix G and Web Appendix H. 
Notes: Numbers in each cell represent mean values. Except for Studies 2a and 3, we calculated all means based on 
+/–1 standard deviation of political identity and self-efficacy. NR1–NR2 indicate the two studies that we did not 
report in the current version of the article. DV = dependent variable.
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Web Appendix A: 
A REVIEW OF EMPIRICAL STUDIES ON POLITICAL IDENTITY, RISK-TAKING, AND RELATED CONSTRUCTS 
Study Independent Variable(s) Dependent Variable Measure for Political Identity Main Findings 
Carney et al. (2008) Personality profiles Political identity Single-item political self-
positioning scale (five-point 
scale) 
Three-item political 
orientation scale (five-point 
scale) 
Liberals score higher than 
conservatives on openness to new 
experiences, while conservatives 
score higher than liberals on 
conscientiousness. 
Choma et al. (2014) Expected benefits 
Perceived risks 
Risk propensity 
(financial, recreational, 
ethical, social, and health 
risk) 
Single-item political self-
positioning scale regarding 
social policy (seven-point 
scale) 
Single-item political self-
positioning scale regarding 
economic policy (seven-point 
scale) 
In the financial domain, 
conservatives show a higher risk 
propensity than liberals when both 
perceived risk and expected 
benefits are high. 
In the recreational and ethical 
domains, liberals show a higher risk 
propensity than conservatives when 
both perceived risk and expected 
benefits are high. 
In the social and health domains, 
conservatives and liberals did not 
show such differences. 
Christensen et al. 
(2015) 
Political orientation Risk-taking (tax-
avoidance) 
Managers’ political donations 
to Republicans relative to 
Democrats 
Firms run by more politically 
conservative managers engage in 
less tax avoidance than firms run by 
more politically liberal managers. 
Fay and Frese 
(2000) 
Political conservatism Work-related attitudes 
(especially antichange 
orientation at work) 
Conservatism scale (C scale; 
Wilson and Patterson 1968) 
Conservatism reflects an antichange 
orientation at work (e.g., reluctance 
to take responsibility, less ready to 
make changes at work, make fewer 
attempts to introduce innovations at 
work). 
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Fernandes and 
Mandel (2014) 
Political conservatism Variety seeking Right-wing authoritarianism 
(RWA) scale (Altemeyer 
1988) 
Manipulated political 
conservatism using scrambled 
sentences task 
Political conservatism has a 
positive indirect effect on 
consumers’ variety seeking through 
the desire for following rules. 
Political conservatism has a 
negative indirect effect on 
consumers’ variety seeking through 
desire for control. 
Political conservatism has a 
positive total effect on variety 
seeking. 
Fibert and Ressler 
(1998) 
Political orientation Intolerance of ambiguity Eight-item political attitudes 
scale (six-point Likert scale) 
Single-item political party 
preference scale (16-point 
scale) 
Single-item political self-
positioning scale (16-point 
scale) 
Conservatives are higher in terms of 
intolerance of ambiguity scores 
than liberals. 
Hutton, Jiang, and 
Kumar (2014) 
Political orientation Conservatism of 
corporate policies 
Managers’ political donations 
to Republicans relative to 
Democrats 
Republican managers adopt and 
maintain more conservative 
corporate policies (choose lower 
levels of corporate debt, lower 
capital and R&D expenditures, or 
less risky investments). 
 
Jost (2006) Political ideology Psychological processes 
Personality 
Single-item political self-
positioning scale (seven-point 
scale) 
Conservatives hold more favorable 
attitudes toward traditional culture 
than liberals. 
Conservatives are more rigid and 
closed-minded, and perceive the 
world as more dangerous than 
liberals. 
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Jost et al. (2003) System instability 
Intolerance of ambiguity 
Needs for order, 
structure, and closure 
Fear of threat and loss 
Openness to experience 
Uncertainty tolerance 
Political conservatism Conservatism (C) scale 
(Wilson and Patterson 1968) 
Right-wing authoritarianism 
(RWA) scale (Altemeyer 
1988) 
SDO scale (Pratto et al. 1994) 
Political conservatism is positively 
associated with system instability; 
intolerance of ambiguity; needs for 
order, structure, and closure; and 
fear of threat and loss. 
Political conservatism is negatively 
associated with openness to 
experience and uncertainty 
tolerance. 
Jost et al. (2007) Uncertainty avoidance 
Threat management 
Ideological self-
placement (extremism) 
Political conservatism Single-item political self-
positioning scale (nine-point 
scale) 
Uncertainty avoidance and threat 
management contribute to political 
conservatism. 
Khan, Misra, and 
Singh (2013) 
Political conservatism New product purchase Single-item political self-
positioning scale (seven-point 
scale) 
Political party affiliation 
(seven-point scale) 
County-level vote data in 
presidential elections 
Conservative consumers rely more 
on national brands than on generic 
brands. 
Conservative consumers are less 
likely to try new products. 
Lavine et al. (1999) Authoritarianism Perceptions of message 
quality 
Right-wing authoritarianism 
(RWA) scale (Altemeyer 
1988) 
High authoritarians perceive threat 
messages as more persuasive than 
reward messages. 
High authoritarians perceive threat 
messages as more persuasive than 
the low authoritarians do. 
Moore, Felton, and 
Wright (2010) 
Social political 
orientation (anarchy–
fascism) 
Economic political 
orientation (socialism–
liberalism) 
Financial risk tolerance Political compass 
(http://www.politicalcompass.
org/) 
Financial risk tolerance is higher for 
individuals with a more 
conservative economic political 
orientation. 
Financial risk tolerance is higher for 
individuals with more centrist 
social political orientation. 
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Shook and Fazio 
(2009) 
Political ideology BeanFest Game (accept 
or reject a bean and 
receive the corresponding 
positive/negative score or 
keep the same points) 
13-item ideological stances 
scale (e.g., abortion; five-
point scale) 
Single-item political self-
positioning scale (seven-point 
scale) 
Conservatives pursue a more 
cautious strategy and are less open 
to novel experiences (i.e., approach 
fewer beans during the game). 
Sidanius (1978) Political conservatism Intolerance of ambiguity S4 conservatism scale 
(Sidanius 1975) 
General conservatism and 
intolerance of ambiguity are 
positively correlated. 
Political–economic conservatism is 
positively correlated with 
intolerance of ambiguity. 
Webster and 
Kruglanski (1994) 
Authoritarianism Need-for-closure scale  F scale (Adorno et al. 1950) Authoritarianism is positively 
correlated with a preference for 
predictability, discomfort with 
ambiguity, preference for order, and 
decisiveness. 
 
 
55 
 
WEB APPENDIX B: LIST OF MEASURES 
 
Table B1 
LIST OF ASSETS USED TO MEASURE SELF-EFFICACY (STUDY 1) 
Checking accounts 
Savings accounts 
Stocks, mutual funds, private bonds, government bonds, or Treasury notes 
U.S. savings bonds 
Cash value of life insurance 
Retirement fund such as IRA or Keogh 
Private pensions 
Miscellaneous financial assets 
Business assets 
Notes: See Lundy (2012) for details. 
 
 
Table B2 
DESCRIPTION OF AND DATA SOURCE FOR CONTROL VARIABLES (STUDY 5) 
Variable Description Data Source 
ROA The ratio of net income to total assets 
 
Compustat 
Liquidity The current ratio (i.e., the ratio of current assets to 
current liabilities) 
 
Compustat 
Financial leverage The ratio of long-term debt and debt in current 
liabilities to total assets 
 
Compustat 
Operating leverage The ratio of fixed assets to total assets 
 
Compustat 
Firm size The natural log of a firm’s total assets 
 
Compustat 
Industry concentration Herfindahl-Hirschmann index for firms in the same 
industry 
 
Compustat 
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WEB APPENDIX C: SCENARIOS AND MEASURES 
 
Study 1 (Pretest) 
SDO. We adapted the SDO scale from Pratto et al. (1994) (1 = “strongly disagree,” 7 = 
“strongly agree”): 
• We should not push for equality. 
• We shouldn’t try to guarantee that all individuals have the same quality of life. 
• It is unjust to try to make individuals equal. 
• Equality should not be our primary goal. 
• Having someone on top really benefits everybody. 
• It’s probably a good thing that certain individuals are at top and others are at the bottom. 
• An ideal society requires some people to be on top and others to be on the bottom. 
• Some groups of people are simply inferior to others. 
Baseline self-efficacy. We measured baseline self-efficacy on a seven-point scale (1 = 
“not at all true,” 7 = “exactly true”): 
• I am confident that I could deal efficiently with unexpected financial events. 
• Thanks to my resourcefulness, I know how to handle unforeseen financial situations. 
• If I am in financial trouble, I can usually think of a solution. 
• I can usually handle whatever comes my way financially. 
General self-efficacy. We used a seven-point scale for general self-efficacy (1 = “not at 
all true,” 7 = “exactly true”): 
• I feel I generally have the ability to handle whatever comes my way in life. 
• I feel confident in my ability to cope with important changes in my life. 
 
Study 2a 
Scenario. Imagine that you have saved money over the past few years. So far, your 
savings have become $5,000. Now you would like to invest the money in an investment vehicle. 
You are considering two investment vehicles (a bank account and a stock fund) for your savings, 
which are: [A] A bank account that offers a guaranteed return of 4%. [B] A stock fund that offers 
45% chance of generating a return of 16%, 10% chance of generating a return of 4%, and 45% 
chance of incurring a loss of 8%. Among the two options, please indicate the percentage (%) of 
your savings you would invest in the stock fund (i.e., option B). You may write down only the 
number without a ‘%’ symbol or any other characters. 
Financial risk-taking. The percentage (%) of my money I would invest in the stock fund 
is: ______%. 
Political identity. We used the following five measures of political identity: 
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• Please indicate the response which best represents your political identity (1 = “strongly 
liberal,” 7 = “strongly conservative”; reverse coded) (Winterich, Zhang, and Mittal 2012). 
• Please indicate the party with which you most identify (0 = Republican, 1 = Democrat). 
• Mehrabian’s (1996) seven-item scale (1 = “strongly disagree,” 7 = “strongly agree”) 
• From which broadcasting stations do you prefer to watch news on television? (1 = Fox News, 
2 = CNN/MSNBC) 
• Please indicate your likelihood of voting for the Democratic (Hilary Clinton) or Republican 
(Donald Trump) candidate in the 2016 presidential election on the scale provided below (0 = 
“definitely would not,” 100 = “definitely would”). 
Financial self-efficacy. We modified Schwarzer and Jerusalem’s (1995) general self-
efficacy scale to fit to the financial context as follows (1 = “not at all true,” 7 = “exactly true”): 
• I am confident that I could deal efficiently with unexpected financial events. 
• Thanks to my resourcefulness, I know how to handle unforeseen financial situations. 
• If I am in financial trouble, I can usually think of a solution. 
• I can usually handle whatever comes my way financially. 
 
Study 2b 
Scenario. You will be automatically entered to participate in a $100 lottery. One 
participant will win the $100 lottery. Should you win the $100 lottery, in which fund would you 
invest the money? 
• Option A: Vanguard Short-Term Inflation-Protected Securities 
Product Summary: The Vanguard Short-Term Inflation-Protected Securities Fund is designed to 
offer investors the potential for less volatility of returns. Given its shorter duration, the fund can 
be expected to have less real interest rate risk, but also lower total returns relative to a longer-
duration TIPS fund. This fund invests in bonds backed by the full faith and credit of the federal 
government and whose principal is adjusted semiannually based on inflation. 
Risk Potential: 
 
 
• Option B: Vanguard Emerging Markets Select Stock Fund 
Product Summary: The Vanguard Emerging Markets Select Stock Fund invests in emerging 
market countries, including Brazil, Russia, India, and China. Stocks of companies in emerging 
markets tend to be more volatile than those in developed countries, which could imply the 
potential for greater long-term returns. Along with this potential, however, come risks such as 
currency and political risks. 
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Risk Potential: 
 
Financial risk-taking. I would invest $100 in: 
[A] Vanguard Short-Term Inflation-Protected Securities (Less Risk, Less Reward) 
[B] Vanguard Emerging Markets Select Stock Fund (More Risk, More Reward) 
Political identity. From which broadcasting stations do you prefer to watch news on 
television? (1 = Fox News, 2 = CNN/MSNBC) 
Self-efficacy. We adapted Schwarzer and Jerusalem’s (1995) general self-efficacy scale 
(1 = “not at all true,” 7 = “exactly true”): 
• I can always manage to solve difficult problems if I try hard enough. 
• If someone opposes me, I can find the means and ways to get what I want. 
• It is easy for me to stick to my aims and accomplish my goals. 
• I am confident that I could deal efficiently with unexpected events. 
• Thanks to my resourcefulness, I know how to handle unforeseen situations. 
• I can solve most problems if I invest the necessary effort. 
• I can remain calm when facing difficulties because I can rely on my coping abilities. 
• When I am confronted with a problem, I can usually find several solutions. 
• If I am confronted with a problem, I can usually find several solutions. 
• If I am in trouble, I can usually think of a solution. 
• I can usually handle whatever comes my way. 
 
Study 3 
 Political identity manipulation. We adapted the scenario from Ordabayeva and Fernandes 
(2018): 
• Conservative (vs. Liberal) condition: Please remember a time when you were talking to or 
interacting with someone who was obviously more liberal (conservative) than you, and you 
felt that you had a more conservative (liberal) position. Please take some time think about the 
situation and describe it in detail, including whom you were with, what you did, what you 
and/or they said, how you felt, etc. 
Self-efficacy manipulation. The manipulation was included as part of the financial 
decision scenario: 
• High self-efficacy condition: Over the past few years, you have successfully managed your 
savings and increased it to $20,000. 
• Low self-efficacy condition: Over the past few years, you have tried to increase your asset 
but were not very successful and retained only the $20,000 principal amount. 
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Scenario. Imagine that you have saved money over the past few years. So far, your 
savings have become $20,000. Now you would like to invest the money in some investment 
vehicles to manage your money more efficiently. You are considering two investment vehicles (a 
bank account and a stock fund) for your savings which are: [A] A bank account that offers a 
guaranteed return of 4%. [B] A stock fund that offers 45% chance of generating a return of 16%, 
10% chance of generating a return of 4%, and 45% chance of incurring a loss of 8%. 
Financial risk-taking. Please indicate how likely you would invest in the stock fund (i.e., 
option B) on the following scale (0 = “definitely would not,” 10 = “definitely would”). 
Political identity manipulation check. Please indicate the response which best represents 
your political identity (1 = “strongly conservative,” 7 = “strongly liberal”) (Winterich, Zhang, 
and Mittal 2012). 
Self-efficacy manipulation check. How did you perceive your capability to manage 
financial asset? (1 = “very low,” 7 = “very high”) 
 
Study 4 
Focus on upside (downside) potential. When making your decision, how important was: 
• Increasing (Decreasing) the possible gains (losses) 
• Maximizing (Minimizing) the potential gains (losses) 
• Achieving (Avoiding) the potential gains (losses) 
Political identity. 
• From which broadcasting stations do you prefer to watch news on television? (1 = Fox News, 
2 = CNN/MSNBC) 
• Please indicate the response which best represents your political identity (1 = “strongly 
conservative,” 7 = “strongly liberal”) (Winterich, Zhang, and Mittal 2012). 
Self-efficacy. Schwarzer and Jerusalem’s (1995) general self-efficacy scale was adapted 
(1 = “not at all true,” 7 = “exactly true”): 
• I feel I generally have the ability to handle whatever comes my way in life. 
• I feel confident in my ability to cope with important changes in my life.  
SDO. We adopted the scale from Ho et al. (2015) (R = reverse coded): 
• Some groups of people must be kept in their place. 
• It’s probably a good thing that certain individuals are at top and others are at the bottom. 
• An ideal society requires some people to be on top and others to be on the bottom. 
• Some groups of people are simply inferior to others. 
• People at the bottom are just as deserving as people at the top. (R) 
• No one group should dominate in society. (R) 
• Groups of people at the bottom should not have to stay in their place. (R) 
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• Dominance of certain groups of people is a poor principle. (R) 
• We should not push for equality.  
• We shouldn’t try to guarantee that all individuals have the same quality of life. 
• It is unjust to try to make individuals equal. 
• Individual equality should not be our primary goal. (R) 
• We would work to give all individuals an equal chance to succeed. (R) 
• We should do what we can to equalize conditions for different groups of people. (R) 
• No matter how much effort it takes we ought to strive to ensure that all groups have the same 
chance in life. (R) 
• Group equality should be our ideal. (R) 
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WEB APPENDIX D: CORRELATION TABLES FOR STUDIES 2A–4 
 
Table D1 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND CORRELATION MATRIX (STUDY 2A) 
  M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1. Financial risk-takinga 35.171 26.659       
2. Political identity (Fox News vs. 
MSNBC/CNN)b .663 .474 –.046      
3. Political identity (Republican/Democrat)b .598 .492 –.029 .565     
4. Political identity (conservative/liberal)b 4.397 1.666 –.068 .535 .714    
5. Political identity (Mehrabian)b 4.380 .983 –.017 .567 .717 .809   
6. Political identity (Clinton/Trump)b 16.216 67.525 –.047 .575 .680 .671 .742  
7. Self-efficacyc .508 .501 .008 –.042 –.111 –.085 –.011 –.053 
a We measured financial risk-taking as the proportion of money allocated to the stock fund. 
b Measures for political identity are as follows: 
• Fox News vs. MSNBC/CNN: From which broadcasting stations do you prefer to watch news on television? (1 = 
CNN/MSNBC, 0 = Fox News) 
• Republican/Democrat: Please indicate the political party with which you most identify (1 = Democrat, 0 = 
Republican). 
• Conservative/Liberal: On the scale below, please indicate the response which best represents your political identity 
(1 = “strongly conservative,” 4 = “neutral [moderate],” 7 = “strongly liberal”). 
• Mehrabian: seven-item scale. 
• Clinton/Trump: If you were to vote today for the 2016 presidential election, how likely would you be to vote for 
the following candidates? (0 = “definitely would not,” 100 = “definitely would”). Political identity = Clinton or 
Trump. 
c We manipulated self-efficacy (1 = high self-efficacy, 0 = low self-efficacy). 
Notes: n = 199. Correlations significant at p < .05 are in bold. 
 
 
Table D2 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND CORRELATION MATRIX (STUDY 2B) 
  M SD 1 2 
1. Financial risk-takinga .490 .501   
2. Political identityb .783 .413 -.002  
3. Self-efficacyc 5.338 .990 -.011 -.081 
a We measured financial risk-taking with the choice of Vanguard funds (1 = riskier fund, 0 = less risky 
fund). 
b We measured political identity by the news viewership (1 = CNN/MSNBC, 0 = Fox). 
c We measured self-efficacy using Schwarzer and Jerusalem’s (1995) 10-item scale. 
Notes: n = 300. Correlations significant at p < .05 are in bold. 
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Table D3 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS BY MANIPULATION CONDITION (STUDY 3) 
 Political Identity Manipulation  
 Conservative Liberal Total 
Percentage of Fox News viewersa 51% 49% 49.5% 
Political identity (Conservative or Liberal) 4.01 (1.89) 4.55 (1.82)  4.28 (1.87) 
Percentage of extreme conservatives (bottom 2 box)b 28.6% 16.3% 22.5% 
Percentage of extreme liberals (top 2 box)b 27.0% 37.7% 32.4% 
Financial risk-taking 5.05 (3.20) 4.56 (3.28) 4.80 (3.24) 
a We measured this before the manipulation task to identify participant’s original political identity. 
b We based this on self-reported political identity (1 = “strongly conservative,” 4 = “neutral [moderate],” 7 = 
“strongly liberal”). 
Notes: n = 392. Numbers in parentheses indicate standard deviations. Values significant at p < .05 are in bold (p-
value of multi-item scale is .064), 
 
 
Table D4 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND CORRELATION MATRIX (STUDY 4) 
  M SD 1 2 3 4 5 
1. Financial risk-takinga 5.198 3.379      
2. Political identity (conservative/liberal)b 4.400 1.749 –.159     
3. Political identity (Fox News vs 
CNN/MSNBC)c 
.649 .478 –.144 .501    
4. SDOd 2.481 1.349 .202 –.508 –.364   
5. Self-efficacye 5.311 1.260 .135 –194 –.116 .078  
6. Focus on upside potentialf 4.982 1.719 .517 –114 –.112 .135 .173 
a We measured financial risk-taking as the preference to invest in the stock fund over bank account (1 = bank account, 
11 = stock fund). 
b On the scale below, please indicate the response which best represents your political identity (1 = “strongly 
conservative,” 4 = “neutral [moderate],” 7 = “strongly liberal”). 
c From which broadcasting stations do you prefer to watch news on television? (1 = CNN/MSNBC, 0 = Fox News) 
d 16-item SDO scale (Ho et al. 2015) 
e We measured self-efficacy using Schwarzer and Jerusalem’s (1995) 10-item scale. 
f We measured focus on upside potential using a three-item seven-point scale (1 = “not at all important,” 7 = 
“extremely important”). 
Notes: n = 450. Correlations significant at p < .05 are in bold. 
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WEB APPENDIX E: RESULTS OF DIFFERENT MEASURES OF POLITICAL IDENTITY 
(STUDY 2A) 
 
Preferred Broadcasting Station 
We conducted a 2 (political identity: Fox News vs. CNN/MSNBC) × 2 (self-efficacy: 
high vs. low) ANOVA. The main effects of political identity and self-efficacy, as well as the 
interactive effect of political identity and self-efficacy, were statistically nonsignificant (ps 
> .10). Although the results were statistically nonsignificant, the pattern of results was consistent 
with previous findings. Fox News viewers were more financially risk-taking in the high self-
efficacy condition than in the low self-efficacy condition (MhighSE = 39.81 vs. MlowSE = 33.48, p 
= .34), whereas CNN/MSNBC viewers showed an opposite and smaller differences in both 
conditions (MhighSE = 32.91 vs. MlowSE = 35.66, p = .56). 
Political Party Identification 
To test H1 using our second measure of political identity (i.e., the political party with 
which the participant most identifies), we ran a 2 (political identity: Republican vs. Democrat) × 
2 (self-efficacy: high vs. low) ANOVA. The interaction between political identity and self-
efficacy was statistically significant (F(1, 198) = 4.65, p < .05). Specifically, Republicans’ 
financial risk-taking increased with the level of self-efficacy (MhighSE = 40.48 vs. MlowSE = 30.21, 
p < .10), whereas Democrats’ financial risk-taking was invariants to the level of self-efficacy 
(MhighSE = 31.09 vs. MlowSE = 37.50, p > .10). These results support H1. 
Conservative–Liberal Self-Placement 
We also measured political identity using a seven-point scale that asked participants to 
place themselves on a conservative–liberal continuum. We regressed participants’ investment 
decision on political identity, self-efficacy, and the interaction between these two variables. The 
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interaction between political identity and self-efficacy was marginally significant (β = –3.96, p 
< .10).  
Mehrabian Seven-Item Scale 
We next tested H1 through a regression analysis using Mehrabian’s (1996) multi-item 
scale of political identity. The interaction between political identity and self-efficacy was 
marginally significant (β = –6.82, p < .10). 
Likelihood of Voting for the Democratic Versus Republican Candidate 
Finally, we tested our hypothesis by assessing participants’ relative likelihood of voting 
for the Democratic or Republican candidate in the 2016 presidential election. The results from 
the regression analysis indicate a negative and statistically significant interactive effect of 
political identity and self-efficacy on participants’ financial risk-taking (β = –.14, p < .05). A 
simple slope test following Aiken and West (1991) shows that Trump supporters’ financial risk-
taking increased with their level of self-efficacy (β = 9.98, p < .10), whereas Clinton supporters’ 
financial risk-taking decreased with their level of self-efficacy (β = –9.36, p < .10). 
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Figure E1 
INTERACTIVE EFFECT OF POLITICAL IDENTITY AND SELF-EFFICACY ON FINANCIAL 
RISK-TAKING BY DIFFERENT MEASURES OF POLITICAL IDENTITY (STUDY 2A) 
A: Party Affiliation 
 
 
B: Self-Reported on the Conservative–
Liberal Continuum 
 
C: Mehrabian Seven-Item Scale 
 
D: Likelihood to Vote 
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WEB APPENDIX F: MEDIATING ROLE OF FOCUS ON UPSIDE POTENTIAL 
 
Table F1 
MEDIATION OF FOCUS ON UPSIDE POTENTIAL ON THE INTERACTION BETWEEN 
POLITICAL IDENTITY AND SELF-EFFICACY (STUDY 4) 
 
Model 1. 
DV: Investment 
Likelihood 
 
Model 2. 
DV: Focus on Upside 
Potential 
 
Model 3. 
DV: Investment 
Likelihood 
 Coef. SE  Coef. SE  Coef. SE 
Political identity (PI)a –.251 *** .092  –.067  .046  –.185 ** .080 
Self-efficacy (SE) .347 *** .130  .265 *** .066  .086  .115 
PI × SE –.127 * .070  –.117 *** .035  –.012  .062 
Focus on upside potential         .984 *** .082 
Intercept 5.143 *** .159  4.932 *** .080  .288  .427 
            
n 450    450    450   
Model F 6.804 ***   9.484 ***   42.955 ***  
R2 .044      .060      .279     
*p < .10. 
**p < .05. 
***p < .01. 
a We measured political identity using a single item (1 = “very conservative,” 7 = “very liberal”). 
Notes: We centered all continuous variables at the mean. DV = dependent variable. 
 
Figure F1 
MEDIATION ANALYSIS: SELF-REPORTED POLITICAL IDENTITY × SELF-EFFICACY 
(STUDY 4) 
 
 
*p < .10. 
**p < .05. 
***p < .01. 
Notes: ab = –.115, 95% CI [–.181, –.052]. 
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Figure F2 
MEDIATION ANALYSIS: SDO × SELF-EFFICACY (STUDY 4) 
 
 
 
 
 
*p < .10. 
**p < .05. 
***p < .01. 
Notes: ab = .122, 95% CI [.045, .206]. 
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WEB APPENDIX G 
 
Method 
Participants and design. Two hundred and six consumers (49% female; M Age = 34.015 
years) were recruited via Amazon Mechanical Turk for the study.  
Financial risk-taking (DV). Similar to Study 2A, participants indicated the percentage of 
money they would invest in the riskier stock fund. A higher percentage of money allocated to the 
stock fund denotes higher financial risk-taking. 
Political identity. We used a 7-point scale: strongly liberal (1)–strongly conservative (7) 
that was reverse-coded such that a higher score represents a more liberal identity.  
Self-efficacy. We used Schwarzer and Jerusalem’s (1995) 10-item, general self-efficacy 
scale (α = .94; 1 = not at all true, 7 = exactly true).  
Results 
Consistent with H1, the two-way interaction between self-efficacy and political identity 
was statistically significant (β = -3.573, p < .01). Simple slopes analysis shows the association of 
self-efficacy with financial risk-taking was positive and statistically significant for conservatives 
(β = 10.076, p < .01). In contrast, financial risk-taking was not affected by self-efficacy (β = -
1.804, p > .10) for liberals. 
Discussion 
Supporting H1, conservatives allocated a higher proportion of their assets to the riskier 
stock fund, relative to the safer bank account, as their self-efficacy increased. In contrast, 
liberals’ financial risk-taking was invariant to their level of self-efficacy.  
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WEB APPENDIX H 
Method 
Participants and design. A total of 296 participants (45% female; M Age = 35.997 years) 
were recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk. The design was identical to Study 4 except that 
this study did not measure SDO. After filling the investment scenario, participants provided 
measures of their focus on upside potential, the proposed mediator. Next, they filled out 
measures of political identity, self-efficacy, and demographics.  
Financial risk-taking. Participants indicated their preference for  investing $20,000 in a 
stock fund versus bank account on a slider scale: bank account (0), indifferent (500), and stock 
fund (1,000). Note that the specific numeric values on this scale were not presented to the 
participants. The distance from the zero was the dependent variable such that a higher value 
indicates a higher level of financial risk-taking.  
Focus on upside potential. Focus on upside potential was measured using the same six 
items as in Study 4 (α = .88) with a higher value indicating a higher focus on upside potential. 
Political identity. With the approaching 2016 presidential election in the U.S. at the time 
of the study, we measured political identity by asking participants to indicate how likely they 
would be to vote for Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump on a 100-point scale (0 = definitely 
would not, 100 = definitely would), if the 2016 presidential election were held today. The 
difference between the two candidates measured political identity; a higher value indicates a 
liberal political identity. 
Self-efficacy. We used Schwarzer and Jerusalem’s (1995) self-efficacy scale (α = .94). 
Results 
The two-way interaction between political identity and self-efficacy is statistically 
significant (β = -.886, p < .05). The simple slope test supports H1. Among conservatives, self-
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efficacy has a statistically significant and positive effect on financial risk-taking (β = 110.310, p 
< .01). Among liberals, financial risk-taking is invariant to self-efficacy (β = 11.594, p > .10). 
Thus, the results fully support H1. 
The mediating role of focus on upside potential (H2). H2 posits that the interactive effect 
of political identity and self-efficacy on financial risk-taking is mediated by the differential focus 
on upside potential by conservatives versus liberals. We conducted a moderated mediation 
analysis using the PROCESS macro (Hayes 2013, Model 8). Results from 5,000 bootstrapped 
samples indicated that the interaction has a significant indirect effect on financial risk-taking 
through focus on upside potential (ab = -.754; 95% CI [-1.285, -.233]).  
We examined the indirect effects within each political identity to assess the moderated 
mediation. Among conservatives, mediation through focus on upside potential was statistically 
significant (ab = 106.387, 95% CI [73.580, 140.882]). In contrast, among liberals, mediation 
through focus on upside potential was statistically non-significant (ab = 22.407, 95% CI [-
30.090, 74.331]).  
Discussion 
In addition to confirming H1, this study tests the underlying process showing that self-
efficacy motivates financial risk-taking through the increased focus on upside potential among 
conservatives but not among liberals. Therefore, both H1 and H2 are supported. 
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